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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-A FLORIDA STANDARD OF
EQUAL PROTECTION-In Re Estate of Reed, 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla.
1978).
In In re Estate of Reed' the Florida Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of Florida's 1973 family allowance statute, which
provided for a family allowance for the widow and dependents of a
decedent, based on a showing of need, but which made no similar
provision for widowers.' The court determined that the statute's sex
based classification violated the equal protection clauses of the Flor-
ida Constitution3 and the United States Constitution.4 Although the
legislature has since amended the statute,5 Estate of Reed is of
interest because the court broke from a previous line of reasoning
used in cases upholding the constitutionality of statutes containing
similar sex based classifications.' The court used a separate stan-
dard in determining the constitutionality of statutes under the Flor-
ida Constitution. Estate of Reed indicated that the court will now
closely examine the relationship between legislative goals and gen-
1. 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978).
2. The relevant portions of the family allowance statute in effect at the time of Estate of
Reed provided:
(1) The personal representative shall pay the expenses of administration and
claims against the estate in the following order:
(d) Class four. If necessary for support, a family allowance of one year's support
for the widow or minor children of said decedent ....
(i) Class nine. If, ... it shall appear that the family allowance provided under
subsection (d) of this Act is insufficient for the reasonable support of said widow
or minor children, or both, . . . then the County Judge may order the payment of
a supplemental family allowance from the assets of decedent's estate ....
Ch. 25274, § 1, 1949 Fla. Laws 638 (repealed 1974). The current version of the family allow-
ance statute is at FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1977).
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides, "All natural persons are equal before the law .
The Florida Constitution Revision Commission proposed adding the word "sex" to the list of
characteristics for which one may not be deprived of any rights. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const.,
Ballot Packages & Ballot Language, Revision No. 2 (May 11, 1978), 33 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. app.
(May 5, 1978). See Note, One Small Word: Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution,
6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 947 (1978) [hereinafter cited as One Small Word].
On November 7, 1978, this proposal failed along with the entire slate of proposed changes
to the Florida Constitution. Tallahassee Democrat, Nov. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 2. Therefore, the
"all natural persons" clause of art. I, § 2 will remain the vital constitutional provision govern-
ing sex discrimination cases.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. In 1974, the legislature amended the family allowance statute to include widowers as
beneficiaries. The act provided that "if the decedent was domiciled in this state, the surviving
spouse . . . [is] entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate . "
(Emphasis added). Ch. 74-106, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 212, 222 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
732.403 (1977)).
6. See One Small Word, supra note 3, at 959.
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der based classifications to determine constitutionality under the
Florida Constitution. Prior to Estate of Reed, the court made no
such examination nor made any distinction between standards for
the United States Constitution and standards for the Florida Con-
stitution as applied to a gender based classification. If the Florida
Supreme Court continues this trend, Florida's judiciary may de-
velop its own, more egalitarian standards separate from the United
States Supreme Court's interpretations of equal protection.
I. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The decedent, Dr. Howard W. Reed, married Florence M. Reed
in 1959. This was his fourth marriage and her second; he was 67 at
that time and she was 64. The parties executed an antenuptial
agreement which provided that neither party would make any claim
against the other's estate in the event of death or divorce. Both
parties had substantial individual wealth. They lived together as
husband and wife until Dr. Reed died in 1973.1
Florence Reed filed claims in the Volusia County Circuit Court
for dower, homestead rights, family allowance, and supplemental
allowances. The executor, Howard W. Reed, Jr., the decedent's son
by previous marriage, produced the antenuptial agreement assert-
ing that it was a bar to the widow's claims. He also asked the court
to determine the constitutionality of Florida's family allowance
statute. The circuit court held that the antenuptial agreement was
invalid8 and upheld the constitutionality of the family allowance
statute .?
7. The summary of the facts is taken from the Appellants' Brief at 3-4, Estate of Reed,
354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978).
8. The Volusia County Circuit Court found that the antenuptial agreement was invalid
under the fairness and reasonableness standards established by Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio,
143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court said that "[a]lthough the
standards established in Del Vecchio have been supplanted by statute, Section 732.702,
Florida Statutes (1975)," Del Vecchio was controlling due to the date of Dr. Reed's death.
354 So. 2d at 866.
9. 354 So. 2d at 865. The circuit court also upheld the constitutionality of the dower
statute, but this issue was not addressed in the supreme court's decision since the supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of the dower statute in an intervening decision and stated:
We recognize that our 1968 Constitution specifically forbids distinctions between
married men and married women; nevertheless, where a statute's differing treat-
ment of widows and widowers rests on some ground of reasonable difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, that statute does not
violate the equal protection clauses of our state and federal constitutions. We find
the distinction between the treatment of the sexes by [the] former [dower stat-
ute], to have been reasonably justified by the disparity between their economic
capabilities, therefore, we hold that section to have been constitutional.
In Re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
CASE COMMENTS
The executor appealed the circuit court's decision directly to the
Florida Supreme Court. 0 The Florida Supreme Court held that the
family allowance statute denied equal protection under the Florida
and United States Constitutions and remanded the case to the cir-
cuit court for further proceedings."
II. 14TH AMENDMENT TESTS FOR SEX BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the term "widow" does
not include males. 2 Therefore the 1973 Florida family allowance
statute treats widowers differently than widows. For this reason, the
executor contended that the statute was irrational and denied equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. The mere fact that a statute treats different classes
of persons in different ways is not per se a violation of the equal
protection clause. Different classes of persons may be treated dif-
ferently if they are not similarly situated. 4
The United States Supreme Court has determined the constitu-
tionality of statutory classifications using three different "tiers" or
levels of judicial inquiry. 5 The traditional rational basis standard
involves minimal scrutiny by the court as to whether a statutory
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary,'" and whether under
any conceivable fact situation there exists a rational relationship
between the legislative objective and the classification. 7 The strict
scrutiny standard is applied to statutes which involve suspect clas-
sifications or fundamental rights. Under this standard, in order for
the statutory classification to be valid, it must serve a compelling
state objective which the state could not otherwise achieve., A mid-
dle level standard requires that the statutory classification have a
fair and substantial relation to the legislative purpose. The Court
10. The Florida Supreme Court is required to accept jurisdiction anytime a trial court
directly rules on the validity of a state statute. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
11. 354 So. 2d at 866.
12. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
13. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "this Court has consis-
tently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
14. "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
15. For a detailed discussion of standards of review for equal protection cases, see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
16. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
17. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
18. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1979]
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requires a more complete record for this level of scrutiny and uses
these facts to weigh the relative disadvantages of the classification
against its utility in achieving the statutory objective."
The United States Supreme Court has not been consistent in the
situations in which it has applied these standards. The plurality
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson stated that sex is a suspect clas-
sification and invoked the strict scrutiny test to strike the statute.2"
However, it appears that in recent years the Court has shown a
propensity to use the middle level standard of scrutiny for sex based
classifications.2' In Reed v. Reed, the Court used the "fair and sub-
stantial relation" language of the middle level standard for a sex
based classification, but refrained from explicitly endorsing such a
test.22 In subsequent rulings, the Court has indicated a preference
for a middle level examination of sex based classifications by using
language similar to that used in Reed v. Reed,23 or by inquiring into
the actual purposes of the legislation.24
In Craig v. Boren, the Court established a new middle level test
for sex discrimination cases, stating, "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."2 More significantly, the
Court actually carried out an intensive examination, rather than
accepting the state's rationalization at face value.2" The Florida
19. See Note, Sex Discrimination: Ad Hoc Review in the Highest Court, 35 LA. L. REV.
703 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination].
20. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute denying additional benefits to female member of the
armed forces unless her spouse was dependent upon her for over one-half of his support
unconstitutional).
21. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
22. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court quoted the "fair and substantial relation" language of
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and stated, "[tlhe question
presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for
letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be
advanced .... 404 U.S. at 76. Reed was a landmark case because prior cases had only given
a passing review to sex based classifications. See Sex Discrimination, supra note 19, at 703
n. 1.
23. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
24. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
25. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
26. The issue in Craig was whether an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under age 21 and to females under age 18 denied equal protection. The Court
accepted for purposes of discussion the Oklahoma District Court's identification of the legis-
lative objective as "the enhancement of traffic safety." 429 U.S. at 199. But the court exam-
ined statistics relating sex differences in traffic accidents in which intoxication was a factor
and pointed out that the law didn't prohibit the young males from drinking the beverage
purchased by their 18-20 year old girlfriends. Id. n.7. The Court accordingly held that the
relationship between the sex based classification and traffic safety was too tenuous. Id. at
204. See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977).
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Supreme Court seemed to follow these guidelines closely in the pres-
ent case, stating: "Under the United States Constitution a sexually
discriminatory law denies equal protection unless a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to a legitimate governmental objective is dem-
onstrated ."27
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF BENIGN DISCRIMINATION
In order to reduce economic disparity between men and women,
the United States Supreme Court recognized benign discrimination
as a valid legislative purpose in Kahn v. Shevin .28 Kahn involved a
Florida statute which granted widows a $500 property tax exemp-
tion, yet provided no similar exemption for widowers.28 The Court
held that the gender based classification bore a fair and substantial
relation to the asserted legislative objective of reducing economic
disparity between men and women, but failed to closely analyze the
actual purpose of the statute. 30
Kahn has been criticized for this superficial treatment of actual
statutory purpose.3 1 Justice Brennan in his dissent stated that the
statute should be invalidated because the state's purpose of benign
discrimination could be equally served by a more narrowly drawn
statute which included only needy widows.12 Justice White dis-
sented declaring that the state had failed to justify adequately this
27. 354 So. 2d at 865.
28. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
29. Ch. 7838, § 10(17), 1919 Fla. Laws 109 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (1977)).
See also FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b).
30. 416 U.S. at 352, 355. Kahn has inspired many commentators: see, e.g., Note, Kahn
v. Shevin-Sex: A Less-Than-Suspect Classification, 36 Prrr. L. REV. 584 (1974); Note,
Preferential Economic Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional and Practical Implica-
tions of Kahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REV. 843 (1975); Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the
"Heightened Rationality Test": Is the Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex
Discrimination Cases? 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 275 (1975).
31. See Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in
"Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases? 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1975). For a discussion of
whether the statute in Kahn has any ameliorative value see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 129-39, (1974).
32. Justice Brennan stated:
The statute nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements of equal protection,
since the State has not borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest could
not be achieved by a more precisely tailored statute or by use of feasible, less drastic
means. [The homestead exemption statute] is plainly overinclusive, for the $500
property tax exemption may be obtained by a financially independent heiress as
well as by an unemployed widow with dependent children. The State has offered
nothing to explain why inclusion of widows of substantial economic means was
necessary to advance the State's interest in ameliorating the effects of past eco-
nomic discrimination against women.
416 U.S. at 360.
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classification. 33 Justice White took issue with the paternalistic pre-
sumption "that all widows are financially more needy and less
trained or less ready for the job market than men. ' 3 Justice White
also pointed out that had Florida actually wanted to compensate
women, the statute could have extended a tax exemption to all
women, who were presumably equally victimized by "past discrimi-
nation," rather than extending the tax exemption only to widows." '
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court later clarified its position
on gender based benign discrimination by emphasizing inquiry into
legislative purpose, as opposed to accepting a mere recitation of
some benign intent. 3 The emphasis on vigorous inquiry into this
relationship has been continued by the Court in subsequent cases.37
IV. FLORIDA CASE LAW
Prior to Estate of Reed, Florida courts did not inquire closely into
the relation between gender based classifications and legislative
purpose when determining constitutionality under the equal protec-
tion provisions contained in article I, section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution. Statutes come to the Florida Supreme Court with a strong
presumption of constitutionality. 8 A statute which does not treat all
persons who are similarly situated as equal denies equal protection
and, thus, rebuts the presumption. 39
In Shevin v. Kahn, Justice McCain stated that a sex based classi-
fication will be upheld if it is shown to be based on some difference
having a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
33. Id. at 360-62.
34. Id. at 360-61. The possible harm of paternalistic statutes is discussed by Erickson:
What is most emphatically not needed, however, is any law or practice that would
encourage people to maintain the attitude that women are weaker or less able or
should have different societal roles than men, an attitude that reverse discrimina-
tion ultimately fosters. A statute such as that challenged in Kahn is thus harmful
to women in a very deep sense, and this harm to all women cannot be neutralized
by the resultant financial benefit to a few women.
Erickson, supra note 31, at 18 (footnote omitted).
35. 416 U.S. at 361.
36. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The Court stated: "[tihe mere recitation of a benign, compensa-
tory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Id. at 648. To remove any lingering doubts, the
Court further added, "[tihis Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value
assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its
history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation."
Id. at n.16 (citations omitted).
37. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977).
38. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1976).
39. Selby v. Bullock, 287 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla. 1973).
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tion." 4 This indicates that the Florida Supreme Court used the
United States Supreme Court standard rather than a separate Flor-
ida standard. The court, however, failed to examine any such rela-
tionship closely, and merely relied on an unsupported assertion in
the brief submitted by the state attorney to hold that the purpose
of the statute was "to reduce to a limited extent the tax burden on
widows who own property to the value of $500 and . . . thereby to
'reduce the disparity between the economic . . . capabilities of a
man and a woman,' .... ."I'
The constitutionality of gender based classifications was at issue
again in In re Estate of Rincon,42 which dealt with Florida's former
dower statutes.43 As in Shevin, the court applied a federal standard
and combined the state and federal constitutions. The Florida Su-
preme Court adhered to the "fair and substantial relation" standard
but failed to inquire deeply into that relationship. In fact, the court
did not identify the particular legislative objective involved, merely
stating: "We find the distinction between the treatment of the sexes
by the [former dower statute] to have been reasonably justified by
the disparity between [widows' and widowers'] economic capabili-
ties, therefore, we hold that section to have been constitutional." ' ,
It has been argued that the rationale used in Shevin and Rincon
is patronizing and in fact serves to justify continuation of the dispar-
ity between the economic opportunities available to men and
women respectively. This rationale is founded on sex based stereo-
typing which assumes the dependency of women upon men. The
ultimate result of upholding statutes which discriminate against
men as a class is to reinforce the idea that women as a class need
such favors."
If the state's purpose is to reduce economic disparity between men
40. 273 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
41. 273 So. 2d at 73. When Justice McCain discussed this legislative purpose in the Shevin
decision, he placed the statement in quotes. However, there is no citation following the quoted
language to indicate the source of this finding regarding legislative purpose. Presumably
Justice McCain merely accepted the appellant's opinion as to the legislative purpose because
the quoted language appeared (again without citation to source) in the appellant's brief. Brief
of Appellant at 6, Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973). Interestingly, the United States
Supreme Court also used similar language and attributed it to the Florida Supreme Court.
416 U.S. 351, 352. This treatment is indicative of the shallow examination of the alleged
statutory purpose.
42. 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1976).
43. Ch. 16103, § 35, 1933 Fla. Laws 554 (repealed 1974).
44. 327 So. 2d at 226 (footnote omitted). The Rincon court also stated that the finding of
constitutionality was bolstered by FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5, which specifically excepts dower
from provisions which otherwise forbid distinctions between married men and married
women.
45. Erickson, supra note 31, at 18.
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and women, extending benefits to widows does not accomplish that
purpose. If benefits are extended to widows, the class is overinclu-
sive because it includes financially secure widows who have never
been exposed to economic discrimination. This class is also under-
inclusive since the statute will ignore the economic interests of non-
widows, who presumably also suffer the same economic disability
as widows. Therefore, the rationale used by the Court in Shevin and
Rincon is at best only tenuously related to the achievement of the
asserted purpose.
Estate of Reed concerned a classification which made a distinc-
tion between widows and widowers, as did the statutes considered
in Shevin and Rincon. The court, however, found that the classifica-
tion served a different purpose in Estate of Reed, holding that the
purpose of the 1973 family allowance statute was to aid the needy
spouse of a decedent during the probate process. The court arrived
at this conclusion by examining circuit court cases which merely
held that it isn't an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to
grant an allowance to the widow or to the decedent's dependents
absent a showing of need." Citing Levine v. Feuer,47 the court
stated, "[iun this case the need is due not to past sexual discrimi-
nation but to the lethargy of probate proceedings."48 Levine con-
tains no such definitive language as to the source of need, but
merely states that the family allowance is an emergency application
for support which should be handled expeditiously by the court "to
prevent suffering by those deprived of their natural support."'
Although the classification in Estate of Reed is the same as in
Shevin and Rincon, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the classifi-
cation stating:
Female spouses of decedents do not as a class necessarily suffer
from this problem [economic need during probate]. Some widows
may not have been dependent upon the decedent. By requiring a
showing of need, the statute recognizes this. Since the factors caus-
ing need are not attributable to sex, there is no reasonable relation
between the classification by sex and the statute's purpose. We
expressly reject the statute's implicit assumption that women are
naturally dependent upon men. 0
46. 354 So. 2d at 865 (citing In re Estate of Sacks, 267 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Youngelson v. Estate of Youngelson, 114 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
In re Estate of Stein, 106 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
47. 152 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
48. 354 So. 2d at 865.
49. 152 So. 2d at 787.
50. 354 So. 2d at 865.
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Had the Florida Supreme Court followed the rationale of Shevin
and Rincon, it would have held that the 1973 family allowance
statute did not violate the equal protection clauses of the Florida
Constitution or the United States Constitution. The Florida Su-
preme Court could have analyzed the classification in Estate of
Reed as it did in Shevin and Rincon and held that the purpose of
the statute was to aid needy widows and that, therefore, the classifi-
cation was justified to reduce the disparity between the economic
capabilities of men and women. Instead, the court made a thorough
inquiry into the statutory objective.
In Estate of Reed, the Florida Supreme Court stated in its discus-
sion of article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, that "[a]ny
classification of persons must bear a just and reasonable relation to
a legitimate purpose."'" This quote is followed by citations to
Gammon v. Cobb,-2 Rincon, Selby v. Bullock5" and Shevin. The
above quoted standard was not used in any of these cases as a
separate standard of constitutionality under the Florida Constitu-
tion. In Selby v. Bullock, a case concerning classification of persons
who are required to prove negligence in order to recover for injuries
sustained by animals, a similar standard for equal protection is
mentioned, but the court fails to articulate which constitution it is
referring to.54 In Gammon v. Cobb, Rincon, and Shevin, the court
merely combined its discussion of the federal and state constitutions
applying the same federal standard to both. It is evident that the
court was groping for precedent to support the separate standard it
enunciated in Estate of Reed for determining the constitutionality
of gender based classifications under article I, section 2 of the Flor-
ida Constitution.
The Florida Supreme Court focused on the need rather than the
sex of the intended beneficiaries of the family allowance statute and
distinguished Shevin and Rincon without overruling them. It noted
that widowers may be as needy as widows, and thus rejected the sex
based classification as "irrational" and in violation of the equal
protection provisions of the United States and Florida Constitu-
tions.5" The court's strong language directly contradicts the pre-
sumptions underlying the rationale of Shevin and Rincon.
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976).
53. 287 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1978).
54. Id.
55. 354 So. 2d at 865.
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V. RATIONALE
Estate of Reed is significant for three reasons." First, the Florida
Supreme Court used a middle level test similar to the test used in
Shevin and Rincon, but made a more searching inquiry into the
purpose of the statute. Second, the strong language used concerning
the dependence of women represents a change from the patronizing
reasoning previously seen in Florida Supreme Court decisions.
Third, the court used a separate standard for equal protection under
article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution.
As previously mentioned, the legislature changed the family al-
lowance statute in 1974 to eliminate the sex based classification,
thus giving some substantiation to the court's emphasis on amelio-
ration of need. Had the court wished, it could have deferred to the
legislature and indicated that this statutory change merely clarified
the legislative objective of the 1973 family allowance statute.
Rather, the court chose to rely on its own interpretation of lower
court decisions. The court's interpretation and the strong language
used, coupled with the fact that the court created a new standard
for equal protection under article I, section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution, indicates that the court wished to emphasize its changed
attitude toward the examination of sex based statutory classifica-
tions.
The Florida Supreme Court did not expressly state that a strict
level of scrutiny, similar to that used by the United States Supreme
Court in Frontiero v. Richardson 7 should be the method of testing
the constitutionality of sex based classifications. Despite the strong
tone of Estate of Reed, retention of the "fair and substantial rela-
tion" standard may leave the way open for future validation of
discriminatory classifications in other areas where rationalizations
56. A short chronology is helpful in understanding Estate of Reed. Rincon was decided
on February 11, 1976. Craig v. Boren, which emphasized inquiry into legislative purpose, was
decided December 20, 1976. Although Craig no doubt influenced the Florida Supreme Court's
reasoning in Estate of Reed, decided in January, 1978, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, which
required examination of the actual legislative objective, had been decided prior to Rincon.
Therefore, Craig alone does not explain the break from Shevin and Rincon, because had the
court wished, it could have used Weinberger's standard in Rincon to achieve a different result.
Rincon and Shevin both examined legislative purpose, albeit superficially, yet neither exam-
ined the classification's relation to achievement of alleged purpose.
A brief look at personnel changes is also helpful, because the Florida Supreme Court is
composed of relatively new members, most of whom did not participate in the prior leading
sex discrimination cases. Justices Boyd and Adkins joined the court in 1969. Justice Overton
joined the court in 1974, and Justices England, Sundberg, and Hatchett joined in 1975.
Justice Karl joined the court in 1976, left in 1978, and was replaced by Justice Alderman.
Justice Karl participated in Estate of Reed, but his departure does not affect the author's
conclusions, because Justice England was the sole dissenter in this 6-1 decision.
57. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
CASE COMMENTS
as to the benign nature of the statute are offered as justification.
The Florida Supreme Court offered precisely this type of justifica-
tion in Shevin and Rincon, which were distinguished rather than
overruled.
Perhaps the court hesitated to take a stronger position because of
judicial inhibitions toward criticizing United States Supreme Court
precedent (Kahn) and its progeny (Rincon). The Florida Supreme
Court took care to separate its discussion of the state's equal protec-
tion clause from its discussion of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution, presumably to avoid a possible appeal
based on Kahn.8
The strong language in Estate of Reed indicates a new attitude
on the part of the Florida Supreme Court and a corresponding will-
ingness to scrutinize the actual purpose of statutes involving sex
based classifications. It is regrettable that the court did not take a
further step and require a showing that the gender based classifica-
tion in fact contributes to the achievement of alleged legislative
purpose. Hopefully, the court will take these steps if a more broadly
applicable case comes before it.
L.D. LANDRY
58. For general discussion of state constitutions as sources of rights for individuals, see
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489
(1977).
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